

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Highlights of Monthly Warning Reports for November 1988				
FROM: Charles E. Allen NIO for Warning 7B 42 HQS	EXTENSION <div></div>		NO. NIC 03405-88	STAT
			DATE 6 December 1988	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DI Registry	08	DEC 1988		
2.				
3. ER	08	DEC 1988		
4.				
5. DCI	9 Dec. 1/23		WAW	
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. NIO/Warning 7E47 HQS				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

DCI
EXEC
REG

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

~~TOP SECRET~~
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 03405-88
7 December 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT: Highlights of Monthly Warning Reports for November 1988

Herewith are summaries of key warning issues compiled by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning from the monthly Intelligence Community meetings conducted by the National Intelligence Council during the month of November. The judgments expressed generally reflect those of Community analysts unless otherwise noted. The NIOs' complete reports are attached. []

25X1

USSR-Afghanistan

The Intelligence Community generally accepts that Gorbachev intends to complete the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan on or about 15 February.

- o Although heightened Soviet political and military activity is designed to gain the best possible deal, all agencies believe that a Soviet/People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan defeat is certain.
- o The National Intelligence Officer for Warning believes Moscow made a major decision in mid-September to initiate new political and military actions in Afghanistan to halt the rapid deterioration in the Kabul regime's position--at least until the Soviets can withdraw without total humiliation. The Soviet decision was not necessarily predicated on the 15 February 1989 withdrawal deadline. []

25X1

USSR-Change in Approach to Military Power

The USSR is engaged in a process of rethinking the Western military threat, the role of military power in achieving national security objectives, and the optimum size and configuration of its military forces.

- o Gorbachev is broadening the definition of national security. He is shifting away from a narrowly military calculus and is giving greater weight to political and diplomatic approaches and more consideration to economic constraints.

CL BY Signer
DECL OADR

25X1

[]
~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

- o Gorbachev and his allies have concluded that past efforts to match the combined power of all potential opponents were a costly mistake and that Soviet security objectives can be achieved by smaller forces. The Defense Intelligence Agency, however, does not believe there are any indications that such a policy has yet been put into effect.

Thus, this rethinking of Soviet national security strategy has not yet had a significant impact on Soviet defense spending. [REDACTED]

25X1

Pakistan-New Leadership

The Pakistani military will continue to control policy toward Afghanistan and nuclear weapons despite the accession of Benazir Bhutto to the position of Prime Minister.

- o Bhutto will have to avoid upsetting the military or she will be ousted.
- o Bhutto in the past has displayed leadership weaknesses: she reluctantly delegates authority or seeks compromise. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Palestine Liberation Organization

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yassir Arafat was successful in forging a greater degree of unity in his organization during its November meeting in Algiers. In addition to a qualified de facto recognition of Israel and acceptance of critical UN resolutions regarding resolution of the conflict, he paved the way for more moderate policies.

- o Nonetheless, the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza has become the key factor in determining PLO policy.
- o Radical Palestinian elements may resort to terrorism to oppose the new PLO policies. A single terrorist attack could derail the trend toward moderation. [REDACTED]

25X1

El Salvador

Stepped up military and and political activity by insurgents is intended to influence both internal Salvadoran public opinion and undermine US support for the government.

- o As a result, the likelihood of more direct attacks on US personnel and facilities will increase in coming weeks. [REDACTED]

25X1


Charles E. Allen

Attachments

Page Denied

Next 60 Page(s) In Document Denied